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Back to the Future? Regulating Residential Energy
Markets
CATHERINE WADDAMS PRICE
ABSTRACT Regulation in many markets is responding to ‘behavioural’ consumers who
do not conform to the model of self-interested maximisation inherent in the classical
economic models which informed the regulatory framework of privatised UK industries.
This paper traces the discussion of residential energy prices from the opening of markets
in 1996 and removal of caps on retail prices in 2002 to the call for their reintroduction at
the 2017 election. Price discrimination has been a policy issue at several points on this
journey, and its interpretation has changed as the market has moved from monopoly
supply to a market with many firms. The focus has moved from company offers to
consumer response and outcomes, incorporating the demand side as well as the supply
side. As in many areas, regulatory practice runs ahead of theory, challenging economists
to develop new models which can inform policy in such markets.
Key Words: Regulation; Energy; Price Discrimination; Residential Markets;
Vulnerable Consumers.
JEL Classifications: L51; L94; L95.
1. Background
More than 25 years after their sale, the operation of the privatised UK utilities
continues to cause controversy, from assessment of how well the markets are
working to Labour Party calls for renationalisation. This paper discusses
changes in this argument as it moved from concern about the exercise of
market power, which might restrict good offers available on the market, to
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focusing on direct regulation of the outcomes realised by consumers. The
discussion is central to the process of market competition, shifting the
emphasis from the supply side, in particular the menu of prices offered by
companies, to the demand side and consumers’ responses to those offers. In
this section, we outline the background, and in the next, we focus on issues of
price discrimination in the British residential energy sector. How consumers
respond to the offers is discussed briefly before a concluding section on the
political economy of markets and outcomes.
The British energy supply market was privatised under the Gas Act 1986
(and the Electricity Act 1989). When the industries were first sold to the private
sector, there was no competition for residential customers, though the timetable
for market opening was written into the Electricity Act. Residential markets
were opened in 1996–1999 – by area for the gas monopoly, and within region for
each of the 14 electricity regions. As well as a variety of other entrants, each
regional electricity incumbent entered the other areas and the gas market, and
the gas incumbent offered electricity across Britain. Regulation of the retail price
was gradually reduced as the market developed, consisting of relative caps
(between payment methods) from 2000 to 2002, and removed in 2002. By 2003,
intensive merger activity and exit of smaller firms had virtually eliminated all
but the five descendants of the regional electricity companies and British
(Scottish) Gas (BG). Many firms entered from 2012 onwards, so there were
about 40 suppliers to the residential market in 2017, but the ‘Big 6’ continued to
supply around 82% of households by March 2017 (Ofgem 2017a and b).
The focus of competition was on the dual-fuel market, and within each
region, the incumbent and BG continued to serve most households. Concern
about the competitiveness of the industry was raised from 2008, with a major
report on the industry from the regulator (Ofgem 2008) and a series of
interventions, many to encourage consumer engagement, culminating in the
referral of the industry to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in
2014. After a two-year market investigation, the report (Competition and
Markets Authority 2016a) focused on weak consumer response as a feature of
the market which restricted, distorted, or prevented competition, and (re)
introduced price caps on tariffs for prepayment meters. However, the debate
about appropriate policy interventions has continued, fuelled by the widening
gap between prices paid by consumers who stay with their supplier and those
available on the market to those who switch supplier.
Of course, this pattern is not unique to energy – it is also observed in financial
services, particularly banking and insurance, where those who do not seek better
deals are generally charged more than those who do, and this was a feature of
the CMA’s report into retail banking (Competition and Markets Authority
2016b). Arguably some of these products are as ‘essential’ as energy, but there
has been more public call for intervention in the energy market, perhaps because
of its nationalised history. Moreover, energy is particularly salient to low-income
households because of its characteristic, similar to many essential services, that
while consumption increases with income, it does so less than proportionately,
so that low-income households spend a higher fraction of their income on energy
than higher-income customers do (Deller and Waddams Price 2017).
Payment for energy is generally through one of three methods: standard
credit three months in arrears; prepayment, a pay-as-you-go system, so that a
prepaid card releases the flow of energy from the meter; and direct debit,
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where estimated annual payments are spread evenly over the year and
deducted from a bank account. Prepayment arose partly as a debt repayment
and control mechanism in order to enable those who owed money to suppliers
to continue to receive energy, subject to payment in advance. While the
number and characteristics of prepayment consumers has changed over the
last three decades, they include a higher-than-average proportion of low-
income households and those who may be vulnerable for other reasons. A
small premium was traditionally charged for prepayment, justified by higher
costs of both the more complex meter and of handling frequent small cash
transactions. Prepayment and standard credit were the established payment
means at privatisation, with reduction for direct-debit payment introduced in
the 1990s. Further recent refinements include, for example, lower prices for
‘paperless’ transactions where the account is managed solely online.
2. Price Discrimination in Energy Markets
Both the privatisation Acts referred to above specified that licensed suppliers
‘shall not show undue preference to any person or class of persons, and shall
not exercise any undue discrimination against any person or class of persons’.1
These duties were directly transposed from their publicly owned predecessors,
and originated from the nationalisation legislation of 40 years previously, but
had never been clearly defined. Alongside these company non-discrimination
requirements, the regulator was expected to have special regard to the needs
of certain groups of consumers (originally those who were disabled or of
pensionable age), though this duty referred particularly to the quality of
supply services.
Relative charges for different payment methods in the residential markets
raised concerns in 1994 when BG announced new tariffs the day after the
government confirmed its intention to open the market to competition. Its
revenue was subject to an overall constraint, and within this cap, it raised the
basic tariff and introduced discounts for payment by direct debit, so that
prepayment tariffs were about 15% higher than direct debit. In a series of
reports in the late 1990s, the regulator concluded that while there was evidence
of discrimination, this was not sufficient to be regarded as ‘undue’ in the
meaning of the privatisation legislation (Otero and Waddams Price 2001a). The
2000 Utilities Act repealed the original privatisation clauses on discrimination.
By this time, the industry was subject to more general requirements under the
1998 Competition Act, which required that companies who held a dominant
position in any market should not discriminate between customers.
Lower prices for direct-debit consumers formed part of the entrants’
strategies of targeting the consumers they wanted to attract (Otero and
Waddams Price 2001b). The focus of competition through dual-fuel accounts
left the descendent of the regional electricity monopolist and BG (the two
former incumbents) supplying most of the households in each region, with the
other four members of the ‘Big 6’ sharing the remainder. The 2008 review of
the market raised another price-discrimination issue.
In its Energy Supply Probe report (Ofgem 2008), the regulator expressed
concerns about the higher prices charged by the large suppliers to their own
‘home’ consumers (most of whom had stayed with the incumbent by default)
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compared to prices offered by the same company in other regions, where it
was an entrant. The discounts to attract new customers had widened to an
average of 10%, but many consumers were not taking the opportunity to
switch to cheaper deals. To prevent regional price differentials which were not
based on cost differences, Ofgem introduced non-discrimination clauses in
2009.2 This intervention, designed to protect consumers who were still with
their home incumbents, was based on the detriment suffered by consumers
who had opportunities to switch to other suppliers but did not take them. The
regulator imposed limits on the companies as a response to consumer (in)
action, since lower prices from entrants were available in most regions. While
the price differentials did indeed decrease following the licence amendments,
empirical evidence supported theoretical predictions that this was by raising
the lower prices rather than reducing the higher ones (Hviid and Waddams
Price 2012; Waddams Price and Zhu 2016). The clauses were not renewed
when they lapsed three years later, and were criticised by the CMA for their
adverse effects (Competition and Markets Authority 2016a).
As in any relatively new market, price differentials were of course needed
to attract consumers from the incumbent, and they existed throughout the
period of market opening, as Figure 1 shows.
Figure 1 shows the difference in each region between the incumbent’s bill
and the cheapest available offer for an ‘average’ consumer using 3300 kWh per
year and paying by standard credit in 2016 prices. It demonstrates the rising
differences in some regions from 2006 to 2008, prior to the introduction of the
non-discrimination clauses, and their reduction afterwards. Differences rose
again in 2016 to levels similar to those in 2008, fuelling recent concern about
money ‘left on the table’. However, more recent figures are subject to a slightly
different interpretation, since they include many offers from smaller entrants,
which by 2017 supplied about 15% of the market, while the 2008 figures
capture only those made by the ‘Big 6’, which were then the only suppliers in
the market. Entrants have no home region where they have inherited a group
Figure 1. Differential between incumbent and lowest bill, 2016 prices.
Source: 1999–2013: Consumer Focus and Which information sheets; 2015–2016:
Cornwall
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of inert customers, and so their prices are less likely to show regional
variations.
Further discrepancies arose through offers of one- or two-year tariffs, after
which consumers who took no action would default onto more expensive
‘standard variable tariffs’. As more offers were made available in 2013–2017, a
pattern was established of three different groups of consumers: the smallest
group (up to 10%) switched annually to get the best deals; a group about twice
as large switched every two or three years, so were intermittently subject to
more expensive tariffs; and around two thirds of the market rarely switched,
and paid the higher standard variable tariff (Competition and Markets
Authority 2016c). It was in this context that the CMA reported in summer
2016.
The Competition and Markets Authority (2016a) found that 70% of
consumers had stayed on ‘standard variable tariffs’ rather than taking
advantage of cheaper offers available in the market, despite few barriers to
switching and the apparently homogeneous nature of the product. They
determined that weak consumer response was a feature of the residential
energy market which prevented, restricted, or distorted competition, basing
much of their analysis and calculation of detriment on the price gaps which
they observed. They also concluded that lack of consumer engagement gave
the companies a position of monopoly power over their inactive customers,
which enabled them to practise price discrimination by charging them higher
prices. However, the majority of the investigation group recommended
demand-side rather than supply-side remedies for the bulk of the residential
market.
Because they found additional barriers to switching in the prepayment
market, the CMA asked the regulator to impose a temporary price cap in this
market, which came into force in 2017. Their main proposed remedy for the
rest of the market was construction of a database of ‘disengaged’ consumers
who had not switched supplier or tariff in the previous three years to be made
available to competitors for marketing purposes. A minority report favoured a
price cap on the default standard variable tariffs, and in 2017, both the main
political parties called for a wider reintroduction of price caps.
3. Consumer Response
We have seen that calls for reintroduction of regulation in energy have been
based on neither the market dominance of suppliers alone nor the absence of
good deals for consumers, but rather on customer inertia in not exploiting
these opportunities. Understanding why so many stick to more expensive
supplies is important in identifying the nature of any problem and its
appropriate remedy. Observation and analysis of behaviour in an auction,
where those who opted in were made a personalised savings offer (Deller
et al. 2017a), showed that much of the inertia could be explained ‘rationally’,
reflecting preferences for different suppliers (despite the apparent homogeneity
of the product), a lack of time, and uncertainty around savings. While a
number of non-monetary factors have been identified in several studies, the
factor most consistently shown to encourage switching is the presence of
greater actual and expected savings, and aggregate switching rates in the
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market have reflected this relationship. Conversely, switching rates have fallen
when available offers have been less financially rewarding. Narrowing the
price differences in the market reduces consumer switching.
Ofgem have been using behavioural insights for many years, at least
implicitly, in much of their work on consumer response. In 2011, they
identified four particular biases which hampered consumer engagement:
limited consumer capacity, status quo bias, loss aversion, and time
inconsistency (Ofgem 2011). This categorisation influenced their policies, for
example in trying to reduce the complexity of tariffs in their Retail Market
Review (Ofgem 2013), and they have continued to explore and monitor
changes in consumer (dis)engagement in the market through annual surveys.
Although many consumers who were vulnerable or might face affordability
issues did switch supplier, concern remained that they were over-represented
amongst those paying higher prices. Evidence from the US demonstrates that,
controlling for other factors, consumers in areas with lower education and
income levels and higher unemployment levels are less likely to realise the
potential gains from switching (Hortac¸su, Madanizadeh, and Puller 2017; Kleit,
Shcherbakova, and Chen 2012). The CMA found similar patterns in Britain
(Competition and Markets Authority 2016c), raising concerns about the
distributional consequences of consumer inertia. New technology, such as
smart meters and smart appliances, may change consumer engagement by
‘automating’ some responses, and enabling new forms of third-party
intermediary to reduce the necessity for ongoing individual consumer choices.
However, it is not clear that such technology will alleviate the distributional
concerns, at any rate in the short term, since those most vulnerable to
detriment are also least likely to be able to invest in and take advantage of
such improvements. While the CMA was more optimistic about technical
developments, it concluded that customers in vulnerable groups were at
particular risk. There are thus concerns both that any unresponsive consumer
is getting a poor deal, and that those in vulnerable circumstances are more
likely to be in such a situation.
4. Markets, Price Differences, Outcomes, and Political Economy
Any market entrant, particularly one supplying a largely homogeneous
product, depends on price differences to attract consumers, and this provides
incentives to both entrants and incumbents to lower their costs and offer better
deals. Indeed, such price differences could be seen as driving the market
process, which is unlikely ever to deliver equal prices to all, since changing
conditions require continuous adaptation. However, by 2017, many felt that
the price differences were too large: they were losing patience with the market
process in retail markets, and demanding more equal outcomes in the near
term.
Relative prices are at the heart of this concern: the gap between the best
deals available and the default tariffs. The best deals are effectively
introductory offers, sometimes called teaser rates, and depend on firms’
expectations of future profits from consumers not switching to a better deal as
soon as the initial tariff expires. As for any switching analysis, consumer
detriment needs to be considered over the lifetime of purchasing from a
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company (Klemperer 1987). Most detriment is suffered by those who rarely
switch.
In their 2017 election manifestos, both major parties promised intervention
to constrain companies through extended price caps in order to protect not just
vulnerable consumers but also more generally those who were inactive in the
market. The Conservative party promised ‘a safeguard tariff cap that … will
protect customers who do not switch against abusive price increases.”3
Similarly, the Labour party ‘understands that many people don’t have time to
shop around, they just want reliable and affordable energy. So the next Labour
Government will: Introduce an immediate emergency price cap … while we
transition to a fairer system to bill payers’.4
Both these proposals reflect impatience with the retail energy market
because it is not delivering equally good outcomes to all consumers, since
consumers do not all respond to the offers available,5 but the proposed
remedy has moved away from trying to engage consumers to restricting firm
behaviour through price caps. These proposals impose direct constraints on
companies as a substitute for actions which consumers are omitting to ‘take’
for themselves. The emphasis has moved from the offers which companies
make available in the markets to the outcomes that are realised in terms of
different prices being paid by various consumer groups. Price caps, if effective
in making outcomes more equal, limit opportunity for new entrants by
bringing down the ‘price to beat’ to recruit new customers and reducing
incentives to both customers and firms (ACER [2016] provides some cross-
European evidence).
One proposal is to narrow the gap between the charges to different groups
by imposing relative price caps, that is, to limit directly the gap between the
cheapest and most expensive tariff (Guardian 2017), mirroring the pattern when
price caps were being removed at the beginning of the millennium. While
proponents hope that this would bring down the higher prices towards the
lower ones, they are more likely to affect the lower prices offered to potential
switchers. Each firm serves a large group of ‘loyal’ customers and competes
for those served by others: a relative price cap which is binding (i.e. the
required gap is smaller than the company has been practising) requires it
either to lower the higher price (as proponents of the cap hope) or to raise its
lower price. Since the loyal consumers paying the higher prices are both more
numerous and, individually, more profitable than those whose recruitment
would be sacrificed by raising the lower price, the firm is more likely to keep
the higher price and raise the lower price. Because all firms wish to recruit the
same consumers who will show loyalty/inertia when the introductory offer
expires, this effect would be less extreme than the case with the regional non-
discrimination clauses, where one firm’s loyal customers are another’s
‘competitive’ market (Corts 1998). However, while relative price caps may
seem intuitively attractive, they are likely to damage competition more than
absolute price caps through tying the competitive and ‘unresponsive’ sides of
the market. They would eliminate some of the best deals in the market and
provide no guarantee of lowering prices paid by loyal consumers.
The focus on relative prices seems to have brought the energy market back
full circle to a political consensus that the market requires regulation to deliver
equivalent outcomes rather than equal opportunities. Indeed, it is ironically the
ready availability of good possibilities from switching which brings about the
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call for reform because it emphasises the different outcomes which result from
variations in consumer behaviour. Focus has moved away from those who are
particularly vulnerable or who may face particular barriers to any who do not
participate in the market.6 Indeed, since price caps of any kind are likely to
raise the lowest prices, at least in the short term, they would potentially
penalise all those who do participate in the market, including households who
are on lower incomes or vulnerable in other ways. How far such penalties
materialise depends on competition amongst the new entrants, who do not
have a regional base of less active customers.
Price differentials are an inherent part of almost all real-world markets, and
the focus on equal outcomes rather than equal opportunities raises
fundamental questions about willingness to accept the outcomes of
deregulated markets, and in particular price differences within markets. It is
not clear whether concern to equalise prices is specific to the energy market
because of its history and its salience for low-income groups, or whether our
increasing understanding of consumer behaviour will lead to reinterpretation
of the responsibility of firms and greater constraints on their activities more
generally. If so, this will pose a challenge to build market frameworks which
reflect new concepts of discrimination and political preferences for greater
equality of outcome.
Notes
1. Section 14(3) of the Gas Act (for supplies <25,000 therms per year) and s18(4) of the Electricity
Act.
2. At the same time, it introduced similar non-discrimination requirements for the differentials
between prepayment and other tariffs in response to a European directive.
3. Forward Together, The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017.
4. For the Many not the Few, The Labour Party Manifesto 2017.
5. Ofgem has made many efforts over the past decade to encourage households, particularly those
who are seen as vulnerable, to switch supplier and increase competitive pressure in the market,
with limited success.
6. If the concern is for particular groups of people who find it difficult to participate for particular
reasons, one possibility might be to include them in a collective switching (auction) exercise
from which they had the opportunity to ‘opt out’, though this raises a number of practical
questions (Deller et al. 2017b).
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